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INTRODUCTION 
Several recent cases have suggested that Due Process and Equal Protection 
are interconnected such that in any particular case the one may inform the other.1  
                                               
+ Vincent J. Samar is Lecturer in Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago and Adjunct Professor 
of Law at Loyola University of Chicago Law School.  He is the author of JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: 
PRACTICING LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (University Press of Kansas, 1998), THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
(Temple University Press, 1991), as well as more than 34 articles covering a wide range of legal 
and human rights related areas, three book chapters, and editor of The Gay Rights Movement, New 
York Times, Twentieth Century in Review (Fitzroy-Dearborn, 2001).  The author would like to 
thank Professor Mark Strasser of Capital University Law School, Professor Nadia Sawicki of 
Loyola University Chicago Law School, and Dr. Howard Kaplan, of Washington State University 
Counseling and Psychological Services, for their very helpful clarifying comments to an earlier 
draft of this Article.  This Article is dedicated to Justice Anthony Kennedy in appreciation for 
both his recognition of and very important votes for the constitutional rights of LGBT people. 
 1. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1724 (2018) (holding that the Civil Rights Commission’s expression of hostility toward the baker’s 
religion violated the Free Exercise Clause); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) 
(holding that under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
same sex couples may exercise their fundamental right to marry); United States v. Windsor, 570 
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The cases that suggest an interconnection do so in order to expand the range of 
protected interests, some of which have been recognized as fundamental, 
without exactly saying what the connection is.  This raises some serious 
questions for future cases, since it is unclear how a future court will look at this 
material to decide cases under the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses, let 
alone cases involving their interconnection.  For instance, might a court decide 
that both interests must be present in which case the range of protected rights 
might actually be contracted?  This Article hopes to answer this question by 
offering a principled framework derived from a broader analysis of liberty and 
equality, grounded in the idea of “personhood,” understood collectively, for how 
Due Process and Equal Protection might be worked together to aid future courts 
in deciding cases.  Since concerns in these areas are likely to raise issues of 
policy and principle, this Article will also call attention to the roles of legislative 
versus judicial bodies in the protection of important interests.  In the end, the 
reader should comprehend that a true understanding of human liberty requires 
not just an understanding of the various liberty interests involved (some of which 
will be fundamental, some not), but also how those liberty interests are 
interpreted to not disadvantage classes of people. 
Section I will describe the Court’s traditional approach to identifying 
fundamental rights under Due Process and Equal Protection, and present an 
example from case law where a claimed justification under Equal Protection 
may have been better founded under Due Process.  Section II reviews the case 
Plyler v. Doe,2 and how the Supreme Court attempted to relate Due Process and 
Equal Protection concerns together to broaden the range of protected interests 
under the Due Process clause.  Section III more fully describes the problems that 
may arise from the majority opinion’s language in Obergefell v. Hodges3 
regarding the connection between Due Process and Equal Protection.  Section 
IV shows the relation of Due Process and Equal Protection in context of a 
broader philosophical discussion about the relationship of liberty and equality.  
Section V then attempts to resolve some of the concerns raised in Section III by 
setting forth a philosophical foundation for a collective conception of the person 
that affirms background human rights.  This is followed by Section VI, which 
applies this philosophical conception to re-conceptualize the current way Due 
Process and Equal Protection should be seen by the courts as interconnected. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
In an important article from the late 1980s entitled Sexual Orientation and the 
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal 
                                               
U.S. 744, 774 (2013) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act as an unconstitutional deprivation 
of the liberty of persons protected by the Fifth Amendment).   
 2. 457 U.S. 202, 211–13 (1982). 
 3. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
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Protection,4 Professor Cass Sunstein describes a then-emerging view of Due 
Process and Equal Protection, which would operate both in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,5 the assisted suicide case, and the various Second Amendment 
cases,6 but would later be expressly repudiated in Obergefell,7 the same-sex 
marriage case.  That now “traditional” view as described by Sunstein, 
notwithstanding the Court’s reluctance to recognize minority rights, is as 
follows: 
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted 
largely (though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against 
short-run departures.  The clause has therefore been associated with a 
particular conception of judicial review, one that sees the courts as 
safeguards against novel developments brought about by temporary 
majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history. 
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been understood as an 
attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory 
practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding.  The Due 
Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the Due 
Process issue whether an existing or time-honored convention, 
described at the appropriate level of generality, is violated by the 
practice under attack.  By contrast, the Equal Protection Clause looks 
forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread at the 
time of its ratification and were expected to endure.  The two clauses 
therefore operate along different tracks.8 
With this insightful comment in mind, it is helpful to briefly describe in this 
Section a few Due Process and Equal Protection cases that arguably overlap and 
how these cases came to identify and protect fundamental rights. 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky noted “[t]he Supreme Court has held that some 
liberties are so important that they are deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’ and 
                                               
 4. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship 
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (1988). 
 5. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
 6. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms against the states via the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (interpreting the meaning 
of the Second Amendment, the Court stated that “[f]rom our review of founding-era sources, we 
conclude that this natural meaning was also the meaning that ‘bear arms’ had in the 18th century.  
In numerous instances, ‘bear arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons 
outside of an organized militia”).  In McDonald v. City of Chicago, “[t]he Court clarified that the 
governing standard is whether a particular Bill of Rights protection is fundamental to our Nation’s 
particular scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 744 (citing 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).  “[O]r, as the Court has said in a related context, 
whether it is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”  Id. at 744 (quoting Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 721). 
 7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 8. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1163. 
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that generally the government cannot infringe upon them unless strict scrutiny 
is met,” requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling interest.9  Among 
the various liberties Chemerinsky says the Court had in mind are a number of 
rights that are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but still held to be 
fundamental under the Due Process clause.10  That clause appears in two distinct 
areas of the Constitution: the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: “No person shall . . . be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”11  Part of the Bill 
of Rights, ratified in 1791, the amendment was originally meant to be a 
restriction on federal authority in order to guarantee states’ rights and individual 
liberties.12  This limitation was expanded in 1868 to also limit states’ authority 
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which similarly states in 
pertinent part: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”13  Given the similarity of the two 
clauses, rights found to be fundamental under either Amendment’s Due Process 
clause will generally apply against both federal and state governments.14  The 
clause (speaking collectively here) protects both “substantive due process” 
rights, which are those usually considered when talking about un-enumerated 
fundamental rights, as well as procedural Due Process rights.15  For purposes of 
this Article, the focus will be on substantive Due Process rights, as those are 
most likely to involve basic liberty interests.16 
                                               
 9. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 826 (5th ed. 
2015). 
 10. Id. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 12. Was the Bill of Rights Meant to Apply to the States?, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., 
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/10/13/was-the-bill-of-rights-meant-to-apply-to-the-states/ 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2018). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
 14. Due Process Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, 
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/14/essays/170/due-process-clause (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018) (stating “[m]odern law interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
impose the same substantive due process and procedural due process requirements on the federal 
and state governments”). 
 15. See id. 
 16. “Substantive due process is the notion that due process not only protects certain legal 
procedures, but also protects certain rights unrelated to procedure.”  Substantive Due Process, 
CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/substantive_due_process 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2018).  Initially, the Court’s acknowledgement of Substantive Due Process 
rights had a rather strained history in protecting the right to contract against a New York law that 
regulated the working hours of bakers.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57, 64 (1905).  That 
view was mostly repudiated in W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), in which 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of minimum wage requirements for women.  Since W. Coast 
Hotel Co., the Court has acknowledged a substantive right to non-economic freedom of choice.  
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925) (holding that requiring public 
schooling interfered with parents’ rights to determine the appropriate education of their children); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching 
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The Fourteenth Amendment also provides “nor [shall any state] deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”17  This provision 
is important for two reasons: first, because it makes clear the scope and breadth 
of the Due Process freedoms that the Court has thus far identified, and second, 
because it protects various identifiable classes of individuals that the Court has 
recognized as uniquely susceptible to suffering invidious discrimination. 
Among the various substantive Due Process rights the Court has deemed 
fundamental are rights protecting the autonomy of the family—the right to 
marry,18 rights with respect to procreation,19 sexual activity20 (including private 
consensual homosexual activity),21 and medical care decision-making.22  Also 
fundamental are rights elsewhere enumerated in the Constitution, including the 
                                               
of foreign languages as interfering with the “calling” of language teachers and parents to decide the 
education of their children).  The Court has also acknowledged a fundamental substantive right to 
privacy.  See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693–94, 699 (1977) (extending the 
right to privacy to obtain contraceptives to minors); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164, 166 
(1973) (holding a woman has a constitutional privacy right to choose whether to bear or beget a 
child); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending the privacy right to use 
contraceptives to unmarried persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding 
that married persons had a constitutional privacy right to use contraceptives and physicians to 
advise on their use).  In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), the Supreme Court struck 
down state sodomy laws that criminalized same-sex sexual behavior between consenting adults as 
interfering with intimate consensual sexual conduct. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
 18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding Virginia’s miscegenation statutes that 
made interracial marriage involving a white person a crime violated the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 19. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (striking down a state law banning the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons, noting “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”).  In 
Roe v. Wade, the Court found a woman’s right to an abortion is encompassed within the 
constitutional right to privacy that it had first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, allowing her 
complete autonomy on the question in the first trimester and restricting the state’s interest in 
different ways in the second (to protect maternal health) and third (to protect prenatal life except 
where the life and health of the mother was at stake) trimesters.  See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53; 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.  That decision’s central holding of a constitutional right to abortion was 
reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, but the trimester system for limiting the state’s interest 
was replaced with an “undue burden” test.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46, 
876–77 (1992); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015) (holding the 
fundamental Due Process right to marry, that had come to be recognized in several previous cases, 
extends to same-sex couples). 
 20. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693–94, 699 (holding that a state law that burdened a fundamental 
right by denying distribution of contraceptives to anyone under age 16 must be justified by a 
compelling state interest). 
 21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990). 
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freedom of speech,23 the right to bear arms,24 and religious freedom.25  The latter 
three, while specifically provided for by the First and Second Amendments, have 
nevertheless been applied against the states by way of the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.26  Reverse incorporation, allowing Equal Protection 
to apply to the federal government, has also been held by the Court to be 
accommodated by the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause, as that Amendment 
has no express Equal Protection clause.27 
On the Equal Protection side are cases involving the fundamental right to 
travel28 and, while never actually being deemed “fundamental,” a long assumed 
right to vote.29  The latter is recognized by virtue of the protections afforded it 
by  the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, adopted in 1870, 
                                               
 23. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  While upholding a state criminal anarchy 
statute, the Court noted: 
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—
which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among 
the fundamental personal rights and “liberties” protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend II. 
 25. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).  The Court stated, while upholding a 
Sunday retail sale ban, that “[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.”  Id. 
 26. See Incorporation Doctrine, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/incorporation_doctrine (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).  “The 
incorporation doctrine is a constitutional doctrine through which the first ten amendments of the 
United States Constitution (known as the Bill of Rights) are made applicable to the states through 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. 
 27. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).  The Court recognized for the first time 
“reverse incorporation,” so that Equal Protection, as understood under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
could be applied under the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause to include the District of 
Columbia, as it is under the authority of the federal government and not any state government.  Id.  
In that case, the Court wrote, “We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.”  
Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954)) (emphasis added).  It further stated: 
The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat different, however.  The Fifth 
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal 
protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states.  
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American 
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive.  The “equal protection of the laws” is a more 
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we 
do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.  But, as this Court has 
recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. 
Id. at 498–99 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 28. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 630 (1969) (holding “that the statutory 
prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an 
invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws”). 
 29. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that the 
state’s poll tax was an unconstitutional violation of Equal Protection). 
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1920, and 1992 respectively.30  Additionally, with respect to Equal Protection, 
the Court has recognized different classifications for distributing benefits or 
burdens, warranting different degrees of scrutiny in order to protect against 
systematic and invidious discrimination.31  For example, if the classification is 
based on race or ethnicity the Court will treat the classification as suspect,32 and 
will analyze the government’s attempted restriction under strict scrutiny, which  
requires the government to show that the suspect classification is justified by a 
compelling state interest that is narrowly drawn to meet such interest.33  If the 
classification is based on gender or illegitimacy—descriptions associated with 
impermissible stereotypes that unjustifiably burden receipt of benefits by 
members of particular groups—the Court will analyze any proposed restrictions 
based on heightened scrutiny and require the government to show that the 
classification “serve[s] important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to those objectives.”34  In most other cases, it is usually 
enough that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose in order to pass Constitutional muster, which allows the government a 
great deal of freedom, provided that the government action is not deemed to be 
outside what is constitutionally permitted.35  However, the Court has chosen in 
a few select cases to apply a “heightened rational basis test” that requires a 
greater showing of justification by the state than would otherwise be required 
under traditional rational basis review.36  In both a case involving state denial of 
a special use permit for a mental health facility,37 and a case in which the state 
barred by constitutional amendment its own legislature and local municipalities 
                                               
 30. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV.  The Nineteenth Amendment provides: 
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of sex.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  The Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or 
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
age.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 31. See, e.g., Suspect Classification, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/suspect_classification. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 333 (2003); see also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny but still upholding the relocation of 
Japanese-American citizens during World War II). 
 34. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 
(1988) (holding intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on illegitimacy). 
 35. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1949) (noting that 
public safety constitutes a legitimate governmental purpose); Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911) (holding that “[o]ne who assails the classification . . . must carry the 
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary”). 
 36. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–43 (1985). 
 37. Id. (invalidating a zoning ordinance that prevented operation of a residence for the 
mentally disabled). 
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from affording protections against sexual orientation discrimination,38 the Court, 
while still claiming to follow a rational basis form of review, found both state 
governments’ actions violated federal Equal Protection because the actions were 
an illegitimate exercise of governmental power that was likely based on animus 
toward a particular group.39  Indeed, in the latter case, it has been suggested that 
the Court seemed to be applying a per se test to undermine the challenged 
provision.40  This suggests the Court regards the function of the Equal Protection 
clause to offset systemic biases that have previously gone unseen, preventing 
these biases from continuing to affect governmental decision-making.  The 
Court has even done this while not always defining a unique level of scrutiny 
for its decision. 
A possible overlap of Due Process and Equal Protection is Zablocki v. 
Redhail, a case where one of the justices agreed with the majority’s decision that 
a law forbidding a non-custodial parent behind in child support obligations from 
marrying violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but questioned whether Equal 
Protection, as it was relied upon by the majority, was actually the correct analysis 
for the decision, or if the case should have instead been analyzed under the Due 
Process fundamental right to marry.41  Here the Court questioned the 
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that prevented residents with non-
custodial children who were under a court order or judgment to make child 
support payments from obtaining a marriage license unless such residents first 
showed compliance with their child support obligation.42  In holding the 
statutory classification violated Equal Protection, the Court, per Justice 
Marshall, took particular note that the classification affected only persons with 
child support obligations, ignoring that Wisconsin law already permitted the 
court other avenues for enforcing support obligations, as might arise from a prior 
marriage or children born out of wedlock, such as “wage assignments, civil 
contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties.”43  Justice Marshall then offered 
                                               
 38. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
 39. See id. at 634 (finding no legitimate purpose in signaling out this particular group (gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals) from using the normal political process). 
 40. See id.  This possibility of a new per se doctrine is suggested by Justice Kenney’s majority 
opinion, where he wrote: 
[T]hat laws of this kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage 
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. “If the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.” 
Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).  Justice Scalia in his dissent 
acknowledges that this might be a new doctrine when he wrote, “[T]he Court today has [taken sides 
in a culture war], not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the 
victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to 
traditional attitudes.”  Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 41. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 375. 
 43. Id. at 389–90. 
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a seemingly Due Process kind of argument stating, “When a statutory 
classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right 
[and the Court had reaffirmed marriage to be as part of the right to privacy], it 
cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests 
and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”44  Not finding such a 
justification for a non-custodial parent who was merely behind in child support 
payments, the Court struck down the statute, not as a violation of Due Process, 
but instead as a violation of Equal Protection, in effect creating a new category 
of Equal Protection for violations of fundamental rights.45  Justice Powell, in his 
concurring opinion, noted this when he argued that the right to marry could be 
regulated and traditionally had been; it was only the breadth of the statute’s 
requirements that violated Due Process, in effect questioning the majority’s 
position that treated the statutory classification as subject to an Equal Protection 
rather than a Due Process analysis.46  In effect, the Court was claiming that it 
was because the interest was fundamental, and not the class being suspect, that 
brought this case under the Equal Protection clause.47  Perhaps the Court thought 
this was necessary given that noncompliance for child support was hardly a 
recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 
II. PLYLER V. DOE 
Plyler v. Doe raises a different but also very interesting and related question 
because it applied a higher level of scrutiny to a group that would otherwise not 
have been considered a suspect class.48  This was a consolidated case involving 
undocumented Mexican children residing in the state of Texas who sought to 
enjoin the Tyler Independent School District from excluding them from the 
public schools following the Texas legislature’s decision to withhold public 
funds for the education of children who could not show that they were legally in 
the United States.49  The issue before the Court was “whether, consistent with 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to 
undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides to 
children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.”50  In 
deciding the case, the Court seemed to apply heightened scrutiny by noting that 
any “denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state 
interest.”51 
What is of particular interest here is the rationale that the Court relied upon in 
reaching its decision.  Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan began by noting 
                                               
 44. Id. at 388. 
 45. Id. at 390–91. 
 46. Id. at 399–400 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. at 390. 
 48. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
 49. Id. at 206. 
 50. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 230. 
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that “[s]heer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this 
country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment 
of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow 
population’ of illegal migrants—numbering in the millions—within our 
borders.”52  This, in turn, gives rise to “the specter of a permanent caste of 
undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source 
of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes 
available to citizens and lawful residents.”53  The Court then went on to state 
that “[t]he children . . . in these cases are special members of this underclass” 
because, unlike their parents who “‘have the ability to conform their conduct to 
societal norms’ and presumably the ability to remove themselves from the 
State’s jurisdiction,” these children do not.54 
At the same time, the Court wanted to make clear that while it was not 
deviating from a prior holding that “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ granted to 
individuals by the Constitution[,] . . . neither is it merely some governmental 
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”55  The 
significance of this acknowledgement should not be too quickly passed over, for 
it opens a door to the idea that public education (because of its importance to 
both individual and societal well-being) might be rightly afforded a greater 
degree of protection under the Due Process clause, even if not characterized as 
a fundamental right.  Where the Court viewed a higher level of protection to be 
warranted, the state is required to overcome more than a mere rational basis. 
The normal Equal Protection route for the Court to take in this case would 
have been to inquire whether undocumented aliens might constitute a suspect 
class.  If they were a suspect class, strict scrutiny would apply on the basis of 
that classification alone.  But the Court would not go so far, stating, “Unlike 
most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this 
class, by virtue of entry into this country, is a product of voluntary action.”56  
Instead, the Court went on to say that “more is involved in these cases than the 
abstract question whether [this law] discriminates against a suspect class, or 
whether education is a fundamental right.”57  In other words, neither a 
fundamental rights analysis by itself, nor recognition as a member of a suspect 
class by itself, was going to be the operant determinate of this case’s protection.  
Instead, the operant determinate, at least in this case, was what happens when a 
non-fundamental right, namely education, is distributed in a way that affects a 
not quite suspect class of innocent children.58 
                                               
 52. Id. at 218. 
 53. Id. at 218–19. 
 54. Id. at 219–20. 
 55. Id. at 221 (holding there is no fundamental right to an education (citing San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973))). 
 56. Id. at 219 n.19. 
 57. Id. at 223. 
 58. See id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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Here, the Court was taking into account certain salient facts.  The law 
in question imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children 
not accountable for their disabling status.  The stigma of illiteracy will 
mark them for the rest of their lives.  By denying these children a basic 
education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our 
civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will 
contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. 59 
The Court found, notwithstanding the fact these children may not constitute a 
suspect class, that they nevertheless would likely suffer a great enduring harm if 
the law were to continue to deny them the public education other children are 
provided.60  The Court was also implying that such a harm would not only be 
suffered by these children alone, but also by the Nation as a whole, which would 
likely deny the future productive potential of these children.61  The latter might 
be viewed as a policy question rather than a principled question, given that it is 
usually up to the legislature to decide what is good for society through 
lawmaking.62  Still, because this particular policy question was not independent 
of the harm caused to innocent children and was also not one they or their parents 
would likely have the political power to overcome (given that they and their 
parents are undocumented), it could not be left unabated by simply saying the 
children did not constitute a suspect class.  So, the Court imposed a heightened 
scrutiny requirement holding that “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of 
innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children 
residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it 
furthers some substantial state interest.”63  In Plyler, Texas failed to satisfy such 
a showing, as its statute was not congruous with the intent of federal immigration 
law,64 was unlikely to provide an effective method to discourage illegal 
immigration,65 and alleged saving of resources was not shown to “provide high-
quality public education.”66  Instead, it would be more likely to create a subclass 
of unemployable illiterates, only “adding to the problems and costs of 
                                               
 59. Id. at 223. 
 60. See id. at 221. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  Professor Ronald Dworkin distinguishes polices from 
principles as follows: 
I call a ‘policy’ that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an 
improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community (though 
some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some present feature is to be protected 
from adverse change).  I call a ‘principle’ a standard that is to be observed, not because 
it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality. 
Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). 
 63. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
 64. Id. at 226. 
 65. Id. at 228. 
 66. Id. at 229. 
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unemployment, welfare, and crime.”67  The Court apparently thought this set of 
interrelated factors should make the policy choice subordinate to the principle 
concern of the unfairness of the harm being done to innocent children.  This 
latter concern clearly raises a question of material justice.68 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in his separate concurring opinion, 
joined by Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
[C]lassifications involving the complete denial of education are in a 
sense unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection values 
involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions.  In 
a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of denial of the 
right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social 
status; the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage. 69 
This language is important when juxtaposed against the majority’s comment 
that even if there is no fundamental right to an education, denial by the state of 
the opportunity to receive an education is not merely denial of “some 
governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare 
legislation.”70  Moreover, as Justice Powell writes, “the exclusion of [these] 
children from state-provided education is a type of punitive discrimination based 
on status that is impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.”71  The latter 
would not be of concern but for the underlying interest in public education that 
the Court implied was like the right to vote in importance, and thus warranted 
substantial protection.72 
There was an important dissent by Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices 
White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, which stated “the Court’s opinion rests on 
such a unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for 
little beyond the results in these particular cases.”73  The dissent questioned: 
whether, for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a 
legitimate reason to differentiate between persons who are lawfully 
within the state and those who are unlawfully there.  The distinction 
the State of Texas has drawn—based not only upon its own legitimate 
interests but on classifications established by the Federal Government 
in its immigration laws and policies—is not unconstitutional.74 
The dissent then went on to suggest that “by patching together bits and pieces 
of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights 
analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these 
                                               
 67. Id. at 230. 
 68. T.D. Campbell, Rights Without Justice, 83 OXFORD UNIV. PRESS 445, 445–46 (1974). 
 69. Plyler, 547 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 221. 
 71. Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 233–34. 
 73. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 243–44. 
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cases.”75  Most specifically, the dissenters were criticizing what they saw as 
judicial overreach into an area where the political branches are supposed to 
operate.76  As the dissenters stated, “there are sound policy arguments against 
the Texas Legislature’s choice [but that] does not render that choice an 
unconstitutional one.”77 
On the surface what the majority did might indeed appear at first glance to be 
judicial overreach, as the dissent argued.78  However, that may depend on 
whether the boundaries that the Constitution places on the political branches is 
circumvented on the liberty side only by a limited set of rights previously 
recognized as “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions.”79  This 
would seem to accord with Supreme Court doctrine as previously described, 
although it raises a question whether such doctrine might be under-inclusive 
from a normative point of view.  If other important rights are thought to exist, 
even if not “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions,” a different 
result might well be called for.80  Additionally, the correctness of the majority’s 
opinion also depends on whether the existing categories for Equal Protection 
concerns should continue to be limited to only those previously recognized by 
the Court:81 race and ethnicity (strict scrutiny)82; gender and illegitimacy 
(heightened or intermediate scrutiny)83; and, with some exceptions,84 everything 
else determined under a rational basis standard of review, founded upon a 
legitimate governmental interest.85  Should it be the case that these specified 
classes are found to be too narrowly circumscribed, then that too should add 
support for the Court’s decision in Plyler. 
Prima facie, it seems arbitrary to believe that these and only these suspect 
categories should bear significance, for each of these categories, at some point 
in the Court’s development of its Equal Protection jurisprudence, came to be 
recognized as areas where basic equality was being denied.  Are these limitations 
                                               
 75. Id. at 244. 
 76. See id. at 243. 
 77. Id. at 253. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Moore v. City of E. 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 80. Id.; see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
 81. See United States v. Caroline Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“It is unnecessary 
to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting 
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other 
types of legislation.”) (emphasis added). 
 82. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996); Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979). 
 84. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 (1982). 
 85. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). 
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really then as rigid as some, like the dissenters in Plyler, seem to suggest?86  
What would be the normative argument for adopting that position?  The rigidity 
of these limitations will depend, in fact, on what theory of Due Process and 
Equal Protection the Court adopts, not just for justifying its decisions in the 
future, but also, and perhaps more importantly, on how it sees the two doctrines 
operating together.  For the present cases, it is sufficient that the Court was 
willing to acknowledge the overlap of Due Process and Equal Protection as 
jointly providing sufficient grounds for its decision.  But how will its decision 
here implicate future cases, if at all? 
III. WHERE THE COURT’S CURRENT APPROACH TO CONNECTING DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION MISSES A BEAT IN THEORY, IF NOT IN FACT 
Having seen how the Court generally analyzes Due Process and Equal 
Protection cases, as well as some of the places where the justices disagree over 
which standard of review (if any) the Court should apply in its analyses, it is 
now worth affording some attention to a remark by Justice Kennedy in 
Obergefell regarding the doctrines’ interconnection. 87  Kennedy’s statement is 
particularly significant because nowhere does he directly cite Plyler, yet an idea 
stemming from that case may nevertheless be operative in the background of 
Obergefell, where Kennedy writes: 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are 
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent 
principles.  Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always 
coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the 
meaning and reach of the other.  In any particular case one Clause may 
be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and 
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the 
identification and definition of the right.  This interrelation of the two 
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must 
become.88 
Justice Kennedy then discusses Loving and Zablocki to show how “the Equal 
Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution 
of marriage, vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the 
Constitution.”89  The possible significance of this comment should not be 
missed.  Was Kennedy suggesting that in some cases the Court needs to 
investigate the way a right is defined or how it operates, as equality concerns 
may arise at any of these separate points?  What, more precisely, should be made 
of his statement that each clause “may be instructive as to the meaning and reach 
                                               
 86. See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 87. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
 88. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 2604 (emphasis omitted). 
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of the other[?]”90  Kennedy does not say.  Still, on the surface, his language 
sounds like an appropriate use of Equal Protection to reveal biases that may be 
deeply hidden “within our most fundamental institutions that once passed 
unnoticed and unchallenged.”91  At least, as seen from one point of view, Justice 
Kennedy’s language affords a justification for correcting longstanding, existing 
institutional arrangements that may harbor biases not previously identified and 
challenged.92  However, especially if taken to suggest that any future violation 
must simultaneously implicate both Due Process and Equal Protection concerns, 
his language might also be construed to limit a more expansive recognition of 
Due Process rights, since Kennedy does not say exactly how each “may be 
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”93  Thus, the problem with 
Justice Kennedy’s language is less with what he said and more with how little 
he said.  His discussion comes up short on exactly how, as a general matter, Due 
Process and Equal Protection are to work together in any given case.  
Consequently, when left without further comment, his language opens up more 
questions than it answers. 
Professor Mark Strasser, noting the Court’s earlier holding in Zablocki, 
criticizes Justice Kennedy’s language for “leav[ing] open whether the due 
process analysis (holding that the interest in marriage is fundamental) is in some 
way dependent upon the finding that equal protection guarantees had been 
violated.”94  Was it not the question before the Court whether the fundamental 
interest in marriage included the right to marry someone of the same sex?  Or 
                                               
 90. Id. at 2603 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Professor Connor M. Ewing has suggested that the line of Supreme Court cases involving 
gays and lesbians from Lawrence v. Texas to United States v. Windsor to Obergefell suggests a 
partial convergence “between liberty and equality, on the one hand, and human dignity, on the 
other.”  Connor M. Ewing, With Dignity and Justice for All: The Jurisprudence of Equal Dignity 
and the Partial Convergence of Liberty and Equality in American Constitutional Law, 16 I-CON 
753, 774 (2018) (I want to thank Professor Jona Goldschmidt of Loyola University Chicago for 
bringing this Article to my attention).  Ewing criticizes Laurence Tribe’s “legal double helix” 
characterization as providing only “a static snapshot of what is, in fact, a dynamic process and an 
incomplete convergence.”  Id. (referencing Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004) and Laurence 
H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2015)).  Connor also criticizes 
Kenji Yoshino’s discussion of Obergefell in A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 
because it does not go far enough when it marginalizes the significance of dignity as it explains 
how the Court “shifts the emphasis away from Glucksberg.” Id. at 772; Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth 
of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147 (2015).  My own view of the dignity 
issue or what Professor Ewing calls “equal dignity,” which I will not be directly addressing in this 
Article, is that it supervenes on a collective sense of personhood that is achieved when due process 
and equal protection are aligned to allow for true human self-fulfillment.  For then the person’s 
own purpose fulfillment as a collective rational being, capable of making his or her own choices, 
is being acknowledged. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. Mark P. Strasser, Obergefell’s Legacy, 24 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 61, 82–83 
(2016). 
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was Kennedy suggesting, if the equality concern in Obergefell that gays and 
lesbians were denied the right to marry had been absent, the Court might have 
never extended the right to marry to include same-sex couples?  This might have 
been the case if marriage as a fundamental right were perceived to be based 
solely on its history and tradition as a heterosexist institution.  Moreover, 
Strasser notes that the Court’s language in striking  down “unjustified inequality 
. . . within our most fundamental institutions” also leaves open how it might act 
on inequality claims where a mere liberty interest is at stake and not a 
fundamental right.95  Specifically, although the Court decided in Obergefell that 
both same sex and heterosexual couples have a fundamental right to marry, it 
left open the question of how to decide a case involving long-term, non-marital 
relationships, since there would be no Equal Protection trigger, provided gays 
and straights are being treated similarly.  Especially, if a future conservative 
majority reads Lawrence v. Texas narrowly to only constitutionally undermine 
the criminalization of same-sex relationships, then the liberty to have an 
intimate, long-term, non-marital relationship might be afforded no special 
protection at all. 96 
Of course, this cannot be construed for sure by anything Justice Kennedy said.  
Rather, the concern here is that a less sympathetic Court might be able to use 
Justice Kennedy’s language both to refrain from any expansion of those 
fundamental rights recognized under the Due Process clause or to hesitate from 
elevating the level of scrutiny that might otherwise attach to groups invoking 
less than fundamental liberty interests.  By the same token, a more liberal Court 
might use the same language to expand the liberty interests and equality 
concerns it is willing to protect.  Such differing possibilities provide, however, 
little by way of prediction (let alone direction to lower courts) as to how future 
cases should be decided, let alone offer much assurance to the public that rights 
currently acknowledged will remain intact. 
What is suggested by Professor Strasser’s concerns is the need to set out a 
more robust theory of interpretation for how these two very different 
perspectives, Due Process and Equal Protection, can be harmonized.  Strasser’s 
article shows, that in the absence of a more robust theory, the basic rights people 
currently have may neither advance beyond their current state nor remain secure 
in their current status, at least where no fundamental right or suspect or quasi-
suspect class is obviously present.  Still, it should be remembered that the 
requisite Fourteenth Amendment clauses do not speak of time-honored 
traditions nor of statuses or even of basic rights generally but rather say, “nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”97  What is clear from both of these clauses is the Amendment’s focus on 
                                               
 95. Id. at 83–84 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)). 
 96. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–64 (2003). 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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the person and the rights people may be deprived of or denied by the 
government. 
This suggests a possible avenue for determining the range of protected 
interests that may arise from the apparent need to trigger heightened protection 
under both Due Process and Equal Protection.  The matter gets tricky where the 
different choices appear equally satisfying to some members of the group 
affected, but afford very different results to other members.  In that instance, 
numbers alone cannot resolve the issue since the matter is one of principle, not 
policy.  For example, arguments protecting the constitutionally enumerated 
religious liberty right of a wedding cake baker to not make a wedding cake for 
a same-sex couple may seem very satisfying and quite fair to ardent believers in 
the sanctity of only opposite-sex marriage,98 but equally dissatisfying and unfair 
to same-sex couples who are then denied this professional service because of 
another person’s sincerely held religious belief.  Nor would the result appear to 
either party any differently by simply having to find another baker without the 
same religious scruples.  For the issue here is not just the denial of service by 
the ardent believing baker, but of what such a denial would represent when 
approved by society at large.99  This is only one example of where an appeal to 
                                               
 98. For a different perspective on the issues presented in the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, 
please see Kristen K. Waggoner, Mastering Masterpiece, 68. CATH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(author was lead counsel for cakemaker).  Ms. Waggoner’s article will be part of a symposium 
edition on religious liberty. 
 99. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
This case involved a cakemaker named Phillips who, in violation of the Colorado 
Antidiscrimination Act, refused to sell a same-sex couple a wedding cake because of his religious 
beliefs.  Id.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reversed the Court of Appeals judgment against 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, but only because of statements attributed to two Commissioners that 
appeared in the record, which made it appear that the “Commission’s consideration of this case 
[when it first came up] was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality.” Id.  
However, Justice Kennedy did note two considerations that would likely be present in any future 
case.  First, “the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity 
of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek goods 
and services.”  Id.  Second, “the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the 
First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Justice Kennedy addressed a point this Article is committed to with regard to how we think 
about fundamental rights, namely that the freedoms of speech and free exercise of religion raised 
in this case, are “an instructive example . . .  of the proposition that the application of constitutional 
freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.”  Id.  Justice Kagan, 
joined by Justice Breyer, filed a separate concurrence stating that she viewed the Court’s remark 
about the authority of Colorado law as able to protect gay people from discrimination just as it 
protects other classes of people.  Id. at 1734 (Kagan, J., concurring).  Justice Gorsuch, joined by 
Justice Alito, disagreed, believing the product the vendor refused to sell was not a wedding cake 
per se but a cake “celebrating same-sex marriage” suggesting it might well warrant free exercise 
and free speech strict scrutiny protection.  Id. at 1736–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas 
also filed a concurrence expressing the view that Phillips’s free speech claim with respect to a 
wedding cake was consistent with “our free-speech jurisprudence.”  Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented, believing that Phillips’s 
refusal to sell a wedding cake was distinguishable from two earlier cases involving cake refusals 
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some further criterion of personhood would be most helpful if it were able to 
assist in resolving conflict in an area of rights the law identifies (in this case, the 
right to same-sex marriage and the free exercise of religion).  Regrettably, such 
a resolution is unlikely to be self-evident, since the conflict already implicates 
important but different interests in which people with very different points of 
view identify. 
IV. THE INTERCONNECTION OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 
Since the Fourteenth Amendment starts with similar wording to that of the 
Fifth Amendment—”nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . liberty . . 
.”100—it is only reasonable to recognize the existence of a general right to liberty 
implicit in the constitutional order.  The general nature of this right is implied 
by the language of both Amendments that protects all persons’ rights to liberty.  
Indeed, the philosopher H. L. A. Hart has noted the presumed existence of a 
general natural right to liberty arises whenever any moral right is asserted (which 
the Fourteenth Amendment does); this was evident when he said: “[I]f there are 
any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal 
right of all men to be free.”101  Since the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment both start with the premise of limiting the authority of the 
government to interfere with individual liberty and states’ rights, except under 
certain well-described circumstances (such as providing equal protection of the 
laws), it follows that both of these documents presuppose inviolability and 
liberty of the person.102  Indeed, if this were at all in doubt, both the Fifth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment say as much by stating that liberty 
may not be denied “without due process of law[.]”103 
After “saying that there is this [background natural] right [to be free],” Hart 
goes on to describe what limits this natural right implies regarding other people’s 
actions.104  Hart’s language here is consistent with the limits implied by the 
                                               
that the Commission had allowed because the baker in those cases had refused to put certain 
writings on anybody’s cake he felt would be derogatory of gay people and same-sex marriage.  Id. 
at 1750 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).  Here, Phillips had refused to sell wedding cakes for same-sex 
couples.  Id. at 1723.  The dissenters also believed that there had been enough lower court review 
to attenuate any lack of neutrality by the Commission or that might be attributed to inappropriate 
statements by the two commissioners.  Id. at 1751. 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The relevant Fifth Amendment provision states: “No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
 101. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 175, 175 (1955). 
 102. See Bill of Rights, BILL OF RIGHTS INST., http://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-
documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018); see also David J. Shestokas, The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, DAVID J. SHESTOKAS (Jan. 19, 2014), 
http://www.shestokas.com/constitution-educational-series/the-us-constitutions-fourteenth-
amendment/; U.S. Constitution—5th and 14th Amendments, FINDUSLAW, 
https://finduslaw.com/us-constitution-5th-14th-amendments (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 103. U.S. CONST. amends V, XIV. 
 104. Hart, supra note 101, at 175. 
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Ninth and Tenth Amendments for government (when no enumerated right of the 
people or power of the government is involved).105  Hart explains: 
I mean in the absence of certain special conditions which are 
consistent with the right being an equal right, any adult human being 
capable of choice (1) has the right to forbearance on the part of all 
others from the use of coercion or restrain against him save to hinder 
coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to do (i.e., is under no 
obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or 
restraining or designed to injure other persons.106 
The acknowledgment by the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment that liberty cannot be removed without Due Process of law by itself 
should be sufficient to afford constitutional recognition of a background natural 
right to liberty, absent some special limitation required by Due Process or the 
existence of other enumerated rights or powers.  Still, if any doubt remains, it is 
put to rest by the existence of both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  The Ninth 
Amendment states: “The enumeration in this Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”107  The 
Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”108  Together, these final two amendments of the 
Bill of Rights articulate the presumed existence of a general, constitutionally 
acknowledge natural right to liberty, even if not explicitly identified. 
Given this analysis, it now makes sense to inquire under what conditions this 
natural right to liberty might be circumscribed.  And, relatedly, for those specific 
enumerated liberties that are protected, are there any circumstances in which 
they too might properly be circumscribed for the sake of protecting background 
natural liberty more generally?109  This is discussed below in the Section on 
conflict of rights.  For now, the importance of raising Hart’s discussion of natural 
rights is to show that this is not strictly a positivist question to be resolved simply 
by what the framers might have expected at the time they drafted the 
amendments.  That is because it draws a logical connection between moral 
language as described by Hart and specific constitutional provisions that cannot 
be easily ignored if the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are to be 
                                               
 105. The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
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people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 106. Hart, supra note 101, at 175. 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 109. Free Exercise of Religion: Rise of the Compelling State Interest Test, EXPLORING CONST. 
CONFLICTS, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/freeexerciserise.html (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2018). 
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thought of as creating ongoing normative obligations, separate from any 
obliging out of fear or compulsion.110 
So, how should conflicts of rights, as described at the end of the last Section, 
get decided?  Certainly, one way to decide the matter, at least where a 
fundamental right is involved, is to inquire whether the state has a compelling 
interest.111  This can be problematic, such as when a state’s compelling interest 
is merely to ensure the conditions by which another’s right, such as the right of 
a same-sex couple to the benefits of marriage, is manifested against those who 
may have a religious, and arguably protected, reason for not wanting to afford 
recognition.  In such a situation, it might appear that the state is arbitrarily 
supporting one fundamental right over another by its asserted compelling 
interest claim.  In short, it may appear as if the state is just taking sides in a 
“culture war.”  To avoid this criticism, a common denominator should be found 
in such conflict of rights situations in order to determine which right should 
govern if the resolution adopted is to be accepted.  The problem becomes even 
more acute, however, when the rights conflict is not between two liberty 
interests, which are likely to have common ground in affirming personal 
autonomy,112 but rather pits interests in liberty against a separate interest in 
                                               
 110. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 5–6 (2d ed. 1861).  
According to John Austin, positivism traditionally claimed that laws were commands backed by a 
threat of evil for nonconformance.  Id.  H. L. A. Hart would later amend this view to hold that laws 
create obligations, although not necessarily moral obligations.  See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 83 (2d ed. 1961).  In his essay, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Justice Scalia argues that 
in interpreting the Constitution he looks for the “original meaning of the text, not what the original 
drafters intended.”  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 38 (1997).  Professor Ronald Dworkin, however, takes exception to Justice Scalia’s point.  
Dworkin claims that Justice Scalia’s method of constitutional interpretation is not focused on 
“‘semantic’ originalism” but “‘expectation’ originalism,” what the framers expected to be the 
results of what they wrote.  Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 119 (1997).  Indeed, had the framers meant constitutional 
interpretation to focus on what they expected, they would not have used the abstract language used 
in some parts of the Bill of Rights, like the Eighth Amendment’s language of “‘cruel and unusual’ 
punishments,” but would have limited themselves to more concrete language, like in Article II 
where they wrote that the president must be at least 35 years of age and “natural born.”  See id. at 
120–22.  Still, Justice Scalia argued back, “The Americans of 1791 . . . were embedding in the Bill 
of Rights their moral values, for otherwise all its general and abstract guarantees could be brought 
to naught.”  Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 146 (1997). 
 111. Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 109. 
 112. Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. § 3.1 
(Jan. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/. 
The authors write: 
The conception of the autonomous person plays a variety of roles in various constructions 
of liberal political theory . . . .  Principally, it serves as the model of the person whose 
perspective is used to formulate and justify political principles, as in social contract 
models of principles of justice . . . .   Also (and correspondingly) it serves as the model 
of the citizen whose basic interests are reflected in those principles, such as in the claim 
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equality, as in cases where Due Process and Equal Protection interests are both 
present.  In such cases, the two interests do not appear readily reconcilable since 
they are not the same either in what they describe nor in how they operate.  This 
gives rise, as Cass Sunstein has noted, to believe that the two interests operate 
on very different tracks.113 
Still, the two interests may be reconcilable if they can be shown to operate, at 
least in some instances, together.  It is true that Due Process may initially appear 
to look backward to history and tradition.  Equal Protection, however, appears 
to look forward to removing hidden biases not previously recognized.  
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that concerns for protecting liberty and equality can 
also cross paths without necessarily opposing one another, provided that neither 
could fully operate without the attention of the other.114  In Hart’s language, any 
limitations of a right must be “consistent with the right being an equal right.”115  
This is one important way, and certainly the way of most interest here, in which 
liberty and equality interests operate together.  It also helps explain the Court’s 
decision in Obergefell, where heterosexual couples would not lose the right to 
marry by extending the right to marry to same-sex individuals.116 
A problem arises, however, where there is likely to be a loss felt by some party 
because another’s right governs, as, for example, when religious freedom 
confronts a state sponsored non-discrimination public accommodations statute 
adopted in service to equality.117  Here, Due Process and Equal Protection may 
appear particularly difficult to interconnect because they seem to send different 
messages.  Provided an appropriate foundation for the two rights can be found, 
even though the duties themselves operate in a somewhat different fashion, the 
deontological nature of both interests in looking backward to the duties people 
                                               
that basic liberties, opportunities, and other primary goods are fundamental to flourishing 
lives no matter what moral commitments, life plans, or other particulars of the person 
might obtain. 
Id. 
 113. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1163. 
 114. In Loving v. Virginia, the Court first held that Virginia’s miscegenation statute violated 
Equal Protection by criminalizing a marriage between a white person and a nonwhite as “designed 
to maintain White Supremacy.”  388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).  The Court then held marriage to be a 
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 12. 
 115. Hart, supra note 101, at 175. 
 116. Eric DuVall, Same-sex Marriage Rate Lower than Rate for Straight Couples, Poll Shows, 
UPI (June 23, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2017/06/23/Same-sex-
marriage-rate-lower-than-rate-for-straight-couples-poll-shows/8651498232582/. 
 117. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in Opposition 
at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-
111); Brief in Opposition at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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are thought to have should provide a basis for determining which duties take 
precedence in any particular case.118 
In other words, a right to religious freedom may at first appear to promote 
equality by allowing everyone with sincerely held religious beliefs to 
discriminate when providing services.  That is until it confronts an existing right 
to service, such as a non-discrimination ordinance, that cannot be ignored if the 
underlying liberty (e.g., same-sex marriage) is to be sustained.  If a right to be 
served exists, because without it the underlying liberty would not exist or only 
very narrowly exist, then, at the point where not everyone has access to be 
served, the two rights conflict and a choice has to be made.  The issue for the 
deontologist is how to make the choice.  It would be more simple if the matter 
could be handled by some utilitarian calculation, which is teleological in nature 
and generally forward looking toward some end or purpose thought to provide 
greater utility or happiness to all those who would likely be affected by the 
choice.  Issues regarding the common good, at least when framed in economic, 
cultural, and political terms, are generally forward looking in this way, and are 
generally distinguishable from deontological claims involving justice, fairness, 
or the recognition of basic liberties.119  Even if one could make a utilitarian 
argument, a deontological claim might still arise if legislation initially thought 
to confer a benefit is seen as manifestly unfair because it denies some people 
access to the benefit at issue.120  Additionally, while teleological claims in a 
democracy are generally thought to be under the purview of the legislature, and 
                                               
 118. Ethical theories get divided between those said to be deontological (like Divine Command 
Theory and Kantianism) and those that are teleological (like Natural Law and Utilitarianism).  
Deontological and Teleological Assumptions in Normative Ethics, REGIS UNIV. (Oct. 19, 2018), 
http://rhchp.regis.edu/hce/ethicsataglance/DeontologicalTeleological/DeontologicalTeleological_
01.html; Deontological Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/.  Deontological comes from the Greek word 
“deon” referring to origin or duty.  Deontological Ethics, supra note 118.  Teleological comes from 
the Greek word “teleos” referring to end or goal.  Deontological and Teleological Assumptions in 
Normative Ethics, supra note 118.  As a consequence, deontological theories are backward looking 
to the sources of the duty.  See Deontological Ethics, supra note 118.   Teleological theories are 
forward looking toward evaluating the results of the actions taken.  Deontological and Teleological 
Assumptions in Normative Ethics, supra note 118. 
 119. As Brian Barry has noted: 
[I]t is not an accident that we have different concepts; they really do have different jobs. 
We have one set which points out various distributive comparisons, such as justice, 
fairness, equity, equality . . . .  And we have another set which points out the results of 
various methods of aggregation, such as the ‘public interest’, ‘common good’, and 
‘general welfare’ (‘good’ and ‘interest’ for example require one to include different ways 
in which people are affected). 
Brian M. Barry, Justice and the Common Good, 21 ANALYSIS 86, 89 (1961). 
 120. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding “to deny a discrete group of innocent 
children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that 
denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest”). 
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to be decided on an utilitarian aggregation121 as they are in service to the 
common good,122 principled claims—especially those involving justice and 
fairness, or the Constitution and its meaning, along with how the political 
departments might be restricted when fundamental rights are involved—are 
generally the province of the courts to resolve on a principled basis, often in 
terms of what serves personal autonomy generally.123 
Regarding where the deontologist might begin, it was noted earlier, following 
Hart, that a natural right to liberty—a right that presumably would apply equally 
to all—is presupposed by the existence of moral rights whose purpose is to limit 
some natural liberties.124  Such moral rights may also occasionally set forth 
claims that appear to conflict with other moral rights.  For example, claims of 
justice and fairness find their grounds in the distributions of benefits or 
detriments and may in some circumstances require limiting someone’s 
freedom.125  Since both moral rights generally, and justice and fairness as a 
particular kind of moral right, are backward looking to initiating conditions, 
neither is solely concerned with consequences, and and any conflict between 
them must be resolved on their ability to promote mutual autonomy.126  And this 
is where a common denominator might be found in a person’s natural 
background right to liberty now properly understood as serving mutual 
                                               
 121. It is a utilitarian belief “that the purpose of morality is to make life better by increasing 
the amount of good things (such as pleasure and happiness) in the world and decreasing the amount 
of bad things (such as pain and unhappiness)” either by way of individual acts (Act Utilitarianism) 
or types of acts (Rule Utilitarianism).  Stephen Nathanson, Act and Rule Utilitarianism, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).  But one 
might ask how often legislatures have adopted, e.g., antiabortion laws aimed at making a moral 
statement without considering all the consequences of the legislation.  See generally Vincent J. 
Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 287, 289–302 (2017) 
(providing a brief history of the abortion debate). 
 122. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution provides a list of enumerated powers vested in 
Congress and also suggests implied powers by way of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 123. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).  The case held: 
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply 
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; 
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.  This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty. 
Id.  See also THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 44 (James Madison); The 
Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 124. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 27 (1978). 
 125. See, e.g., Compelling-State-Interest-Test Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/compelling-state-interest-test/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
 126. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
87 (1991).  Samar writes, “By individual autonomy, I mean that the conditions that govern a 
person’s participation in a rule-governed activity are only those conditions that are set by the 
activity itself.”  Id. at 86–87. 
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autonomy.127  In other words, Hart’s language against using “coercion and 
restraint” applies just as equally to prevent background claims to natural liberty 
from ever being used as a constraint to undermine mutual autonomy as it does 
to undermining individual autonomy.128  This is also the place where Due 
Process liberty rights and Equal Protection claims appear to cross hairs. 
The fact that both Due Process and Equal Protection engage liberty and 
equality claims that are fundamentally deontological would seem to suggest that 
they might have a common basis for resolution by promoting overall individual 
autonomy for all concerned in the sense of promoting mutual self-fulfillment.  
However, because the messages that Due Process and Equal Protection send, as 
Sunstein notes, appear to operate on different tracks, resolving conflicts between 
the two may not be obvious.  Perhaps, the problem Sunstein is identifying lies 
not with the difficulty of the resolution, but with how fundamental liberty claims 
have traditionally been described.  As Sunstein states, Due Process claims 
address liberties thought to be long-standing.129  By contrast, Equal Protection 
claims unearth biases that may only now be publicly recognized.  In fact, both 
operate in common service to individuals being collectively able to fulfill their 
various ambitions, desires, and worthiest capacities, and therefore both may find 
the condition of their resolution not so much (or perhaps even at all) in history 
and tradition, which may serve only as a guide, but in what truly serves to create 
human self-fulfillment collectively understood.130  But, if this is so, it raises the 
question: how should this notion of personhood’s self-fulfillment now be 
exemplified to resolve actual conflicts of rights? 
                                               
 127. See, e.g., id. at 87.  Samar argued, “All conflicts of rights involving privacy can be 
resolved by an appeal to maximal autonomy.”  Id. at 104.  Also, “[t]he protection of autonomy is 
relevant to deciding whether an interest the state seeks to protect is truly more compelling than 
privacy.”  Id. at 112.  This general claim about privacy can be applied to other “active” and 
“passive” rights in which the former “are those that permit the holder of the right to perform an 
action [free from outside interference], such as making a speech, publishing a newspaper report, or 
practicing a particular religious belief.”  Id. at 104.  While the latter 
are those that afford the subject a benefit, such as a trial by his or her peers, a speedy and 
public trial, the right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of witnesses, and the 
right to the assistance of counsel.  Passive rights involve positive freedom in the sense 
that the respondent of the right has the duty to afford the holder certain benefits. 
Id. at 104–05.  Together the two types of rights when put into the proper balance can serve to 
promote maximal autonomy and individual self-fulfillment. 
 128. Hart, supra note 101, at 175. 
 129. See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1163. 
 130. One definition of self-fulfillment defines it as “the act or fact of fulfilling one’s ambitions, 
desires, etc., through one’s own efforts.”  Self-Fulfillment, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/self-fulfillment (last visited Aug. 19, 2018).  Alan Gewirth has 
noted: 
[T]here is a general conception of it which can give an initial idea of why self-fulfillment 
has so often been highly valued as a primary constituent, or indeed as the inclusive 
content, of a good, happy human life.  According to this conception, self-fulfillment 
consists in carrying to fruition one’s deepest desires or one’s worthiest capacities. 
ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 3 (1998). 
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Personhood’s self-fulfillment defies simple identification, as it encompasses 
by virtue of its ability when construed both individually and collectively, to 
include both liberty of the person and equal treatment of all those similarly 
situated, and is not necessarily limited by citizenship.131  This is manifested by 
personhood’s failure to be just limited to maximizing individual liberty (the 
individualistic or libertarian position),132 but also includes the full range of 
interests that must be provided if liberty is to be extended (the more egalitarian 
position).133  John Rawls’s egalitarian view of justice identifies this latter 
claim.134  In this sense, personhood’s self-fulfillment engages two types of 
deontological claims in ongoing dialogue with one another.  Due Process 
identifies the first of these two types of claims: liberties that may have been long 
valued, or perhaps are only now showing themselves to be strongly cared about 
because they attach to important aspects of human identity.  Equal Protection 
identifies the second of these two types of claims, by comparing how fairly the 
Due Process liberties are actually distributed among individuals.135  The two do 
operate on different tracks, but apparently only in opposition to one another until 
personhood’s self-fulfillment takes on this collective sense. 
                                               
 131. See Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 INT’L J. OF CONST. 
L. 9, 9 (2010). 
 132. Jan Narveson argues for the libertarian position that people “do have a general right to 
liberty and consequently do not have a fundamental right to equality, of any interesting kind.”  Jan 
Naverson, Liberty and Equality—A Question of Balance, in ETHICS: THE BIG QUESTIONS 271 
(James Sterba ed., 2nd ed. 2002).  Also, “A positive right to liberty would entail on all of us the 
duty to promote liberty—not just the duty to respect it.”  Id. at 276.  Indeed, Naverson argues 
against claims of equal opportunity stating that “no one may intervene to prevent people from taking 
legitimate opportunities they have been, or are, freely offered.”  Id. at 282. 
 133. See Bosniak, supra note 131, at 25–29. 
 134. In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls sets out two principles of justice he believes 
would be chosen in an “original position of equality [that] corresponds to the state of nature in the 
traditional theory of the social contract.”  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (1971).  Rawls 
continues and states: 
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, 
his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.  I shall even assume 
that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological 
propensities.  The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures 
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of 
natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. 
Id.  Under these circumstances, Rawls argues: 
[T]he persons in the initial situation would choose two rather different principles: the 
first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds 
that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, 
are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for 
the least advantaged members of society. 
Id. at 210. 
 135. See id. 
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Due Process remains relevant and substantive in that it discovers specific 
rights people might need to obtain self-fulfillment.136  Equal protection operates 
comparatively to ensure the rights Due Process identifies are fairly 
distributed.137  In this sense, equal protection operates by comparing rights 
holders without necessarily identifying the right being held.  However, because 
the right being held may itself be described in a manner that hides an unfair 
distribution, like when marriage is identified as operating only between same 
race or opposite-sex persons, Equal Protection can invalidate the limitation to 
ensure a fair distribution.138  In this sense, Equal Protection prevents descriptions 
of rights that on their face would prevent, absent adequate justification, a fair 
distribution of the essential aspects of the liberty to which all are entitled.139  It 
may also invalidate penalties designed to restrict liberty by denying benefits 
where the only purpose for the denial is to maintain a “neutral rule” of general 
applicability that is claimed to be in service to the common good, but in fact may 
not be so.140  Such neutral rules raise concerns when they appear to impinge 
upon areas of personal privacy or religious liberty with little or no evidence 
showing how they implicate the greater good of society, such as might be the 
case where one makes use of a drug as part of a religious or artistic ritual under 
circumstances where its effect is unlikely to burden the society at large.141  That 
personhood in this collective sense might be helpful to afford greater liberty even 
against society’s neutral rules of general applicability, is especially important to 
recognize when no issue of equality is likely to arise but personal autonomy and 
the desire to live a self-fulfilled life may still be very much at stake. 
V. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 
Now arises the practical question: how do we relate personhood’s self-
fulfillment to resolving actual conflicts of rights where the real debate is between 
                                               
 136. See Substantive Due Process, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/substantive_due_process (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 137. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1962) (finding that the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring an Equal Protection challenge to a 1901 Tennessee statute that unfairly 
apportioned seats in the General Assembly). 
 138. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015) (describing how the 
understanding of the institution of marriage has changed with the end of coverture, among other 
changes). 
 139. See id. at 2603.  Justice Kennedy, referring to the holding in Zablocki v. Redhail, stated, 
“the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the challenged law, 
which, as already noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-support payments from marrying 
without judicial approval.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 140. See Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 141. See id. at 881.  As a result of this decision, both Congress and many state legislatures 
adopted Religious Freedom Restoration statutes to ensure religious liberty is only impinged upon 
where a compelling state interest is present and the intrusion is narrowly drawn.  See generally 
Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act Overview, FINDLAW, 
http://civilrights.findlaw.com/discrimination/federal-religious-freedom-restoration-act-
overview.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
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individual liberty and equality for all?  Professor Alan Gewirth has argued that 
the prescriptive nature of morality presupposes that any moral theory addresses 
moral agents in the sense of being voluntary purposive actors.142  Indeed, if these 
features were not part of moral agency, moral theories would be at a loss in 
explaining moral responsibility, since such claims presuppose that the persons 
addressed are capable of making choices.143  Indeed, central to claims of criminal 
responsibility, certainly in most American jurisdictions, is the assurance that 
individual choices are voluntary, and not just the consequence of some mental 
illness.144  Elsewhere, Gewirth has argued that the notion of moral agency better 
explains the sense of person in debates over the moral and legal status of 
abortion, at least, if one resides in a pluralistic society that follows no single 
moral or religious doctrine.145  What is of significance for the discussion here is 
to recognize how personhood in the collective sense, as coextensive with the 
aforesaid definition of moral agents, can aid the resolution of conflicts between 
Due Process and Equal Protection concerns. 
Moral agency operates to identify normal adult human beings as voluntary, 
purposive human actors, who make choices to act for their own benefit because 
they see their choice as affording some level of self-fulfillment.146  
Consequently, such choices necessarily presuppose that the person is both free 
to act and has the capacity to perform and carry out at least some actions.147  
Specifically, on the voluntary side of personhood, freedom from outside 
interference is essential as “it concerns the way actions are controlled as ongoing 
events.”148  Here, human freedom operates procedurally to allow human beings 
the greatest range of action.149  This notion of human freedom also accords with 
the purposiveness side as the other identifying ingredient of human action.  
Purposiveness plays a substantive role in that it “comprises the object or goal of 
the action in the sense of the good [the agent] wants to achieve or have through 
this causation.”150  Thus, freedom to choose where one’s physical, mental, or 
economic abilities prevent actually carrying out the choice is not much of a 
freedom of choice.  This suggests that well-being, physical, mental, and 
economic abilities are equally essential to any action that one might 
                                               
 142. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 27. 
 143. See id. at 26–27. 
 144. See, e.g., The ‘Model Penal Code’ Test for Legal Insanity, FINDLAW, 
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/the-model-penal-code-test-for-legal-insanity.html 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018). 
 145. See Vincent J. Samar, Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 
287, 320–21 (2017). 
 146. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 27. 
 147. See id. at 27–28. 
 148. Id. at 41. 
 149. See id. at 31, 41. 
 150. Id. at 41. 
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undertake.151  Such well-being might be said to first require the absence of 
external impediments to one’s choice.152  As such, this is as much about ensuring 
the voluntariness of the action as it is about the individual purposes that give it 
rise.  Beyond this, there will be situations where the possibility of choice will 
need assistance from education, health care, a decent standard of living, and 
more for purposes to even emerge.153  What duties are there to provide this 
assistance and what obligations are there to be free of external interference are 
what one would hope that a good moral theory and a good theory of political 
liberalism would make clear.  This is also the place where libertarian and 
egalitarian views of the person must cease being at odds and find common 
ground in order for personhood to truly become self-fulfilling. 
Gewirth’s derivation for a supreme principle of morality can provide an 
analogous set of solutions for resolving Due Process and Equal Protection 
claims, whether one adopts his supreme principle of morality or not.154  Of 
particular significance in Gewirth’s derivation are his arguments for relating 
liberty and equality concerns in a way that might well define the relationship 
between Due Process an Equal Protection.155  This is made clear by the argument 
he sets forth for the derivation of the principle of morality and the way it works 
to resolve conflict of rights cases.  Gewirth’s arguments for the derivation of a 
supreme principle of morality, which he calls the “Principle of Generic 
Consistency,” or “PGC” for short, starts from within the internal conative 
standpoint of the agent (that is, any voluntary purposive actor), and proceeds to 
explicate what the agent qua agent would logically have to agree to, from her 
own point of view, on pain of contradiction.156  His argument is summarized as 
follows: 
1.  Every agent by performing any voluntary act presupposes the 
action is good for some purpose of her own.157 
2. Since performing any such action necessarily presupposes that the 
agent has the freedom and well-being to perform it, from the agent’s 
point of view she claims rights to freedom and well-being, as 
necessary to her action being voluntary and purposive respectively.158 
3. Indeed, since the rights being asserted are claim rights, if the agent 
were to deny she had these rights, then from within her own internal 
                                               
 151. Gewirth takes particular note “that the agent [must] act in accord with the generic rights 
of his recipients and not all of mankind[.]”  Id. at 201.  In doing so, he must “take favorable account 
of his recipients’ wishes, since the recipient normally does not want to be coerced or to undergo 
deterioration of his abilities to have basic, nonsubtractive, and additive goods.”  Id. at 202–03. 
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connotative standpoint she would be admitting other persons are 
permitted to prevent her from having these same rights and that 
consequently she may not have these rights at all.159 
4. But such an admission would be in contradiction to the agent’s own 
action, since the agent’s performance implies she must have freedom 
and well-being.  Thus, at least from within the agent’s point of view, 
the rights to freedom and well-being are necessarily being claimed 
whenever she performs any action for any purpose of her own.160 
But this is not the end of the story according to Gewirth.  If it were, all he 
would have achieved is an egoistic/prudentialist view for rights claims in which 
prudential claims are set out, but in no way could resolve likely conflicts 
between claims of different persons.161 
Next, as a rational actor the agent realizes that any other agent, that is, any 
other person wanting to do some action for some purpose, would claim these 
same rights and there is nothing special to distinguish her from any other agent 
insofar as she is an agent.162  Here is where the collectivist notion of personhood 
begins to assert itself.  If there is nothing to distinguish this agent from any other 
agent, then presumably any agent seeking to perform any action for any purpose 
would be just as entitled to make these same rights claims.163  Consequently, if 
the agent denied her fellow agents’ rights on the same basis she affirms for 
herself, she would be impliedly saying, “I have rights because I am a prospective 
purposive agent; you don’t have rights, even though you are a prospective 
purposive agent, where the sufficient reason for having these rights is just being 
a prospective purposive agent.”164  That position, Gewirth points out, would also 
be a contradiction; so, Gewirth believes that logically any agent is compelled to 
accept, as the supreme principle of morality, “Act in accord with the generic 
rights [to freedom and well-being] of your recipients as well as yourself.”165  In 
further describing his principle, Gewirth notes that it is categorically necessary 
because an agent who has gone through this dialectically necessary procedure 
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would come to exactly the same conclusion on pain of contradiction.166  For this 
reason, he states, it is fair to describe the PGC not just as a dialectically derived 
principle, but also as an assertoric principle or, in other words, a statement of 
moral fact.167 
Putting aside possible philosophical debates over whether Gewirth has, by his 
method, finally achieved a supreme categorical principle of morality, he has 
certainly explained why any agent from within her own point of view cannot 
rationally claim rights to freedom and well-being for herself without also 
recognizing that all other agents could rationally make these very same rights 
claims.168  Moreover, because Gewirth’s argument proceeds without begging 
any questions, as would likely happen if his argument were grounded in a 
particular religious or cultural tradition, it can legitimately claim a greater 
universality than more particularistic religious or culturally-based moralities.  
For this reason, the argument provides a rational foundation for human rights 
generally, and the civil liberties afforded by the U.S. Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment particularly.169 
The argument logically requires that each agent views herself and every other 
agent as similarly situated.  This in particular should make it attractive as a useful 
guide in discussions concerning Equal Protection jurisprudence where being 
similarly situated is a key concern.  Even if it were the case that the theory 
somehow failed to logically compel the mutual recognition of  agents’ rights, 
certainly the idea of “rule of law” as binding generally on all persons, including 
when grounded on principles recognized by the international community, 
implies a general public equality and the recognition of equal rights among all 
persons.170  This also fits within Hart’s argument that a background, general, 
                                               
 166. Id. at 133. 
 167. Id. at 161. 
 168. See generally id. at 109–10. 
 169. Allen Buchanan writes: 
It is often said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various human 
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        . . .  
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Allen Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 96 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
 170. The United Nations defines “rule of law” as follows: 
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natural, and equal right to liberty exists whenever any moral right is claimed.171  
Consequently, the rights that arise out of claims by moral agents as voluntary, 
purposive actors, are just as relevant to issues involving conflicts related to the 
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as they are to resolving moral 
conflicts between liberty and equality.  While the argument might not be the 
whole truth of how constitutional questions are decided because constitutional 
interpretation is fraught with debates over history and tradition,172 nevertheless, 
it should provide a valuable resource for resolving rights conflicts between Due 
Process and Equal Protection generally. 
Between private individuals, Gewirth describes the way to handle conflicts 
involving freedom claims by noting that the freedom component of the PGC 
involves personal consent, autonomy, and privacy of all persons as “equal 
rights” holders.173  These three features, which are also features that play a role 
                                               
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
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CONSTITUTION 361–405 (2016) (discussing the various canons and norms that distinguish 
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Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin arguing for and against Scalia’s originalist 
interpretation of constitutional norms being like statutory norms).  Philip Bobbit demands, based 
on an earlier work: 
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preferences, for choosing among alternative outcomes generated by the operation of the 
various forms of argument” [prudential, structural, ethical and historical]. But is this 
reasonable sounding demand really necessary?  I think it depends upon a frequent 
confusion between how we know that we know something (the subject of epistemology) 
and what in fact we know when we know something (the subject matter of ontology). 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION xvi (1991). 
 173. See GEWIRTH, supra note 124, at 256.  Privacy, here in context to both a private act and 
a private state of affairs, provides respectively the ideal case examples of where individual freedom 
should not be interfered without further inquiry because, prima facie, no interest of another appears 
to be infringed.  See also SAMAR, supra note 126, at 68–69, 97, 103. 
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in substantive Due Process considerations, define a level of freedom in a most 
basic sense where no other interest is presupposed.174  Similarly, on the well-
being side, Gewirth defines three levels of well-being in their respective order 
of importance to purpose-fulfillment.175  The first and most essential level of 
well-being, which Gewirth calls “basic,” involves life, physical integrity, and 
mental equilibrium.176  This is the most essential aspect of well-being because 
without these features, a person could not be an agent, that is, a voluntary 
purposive actor.177  The second most important level is “non-subtractive” well-
being.178  Here, the concern is with the abilities and conditions necessary for 
maintaining one’s current level of purpose fulfillment.179  An agent’s non-
subtractive well-being is affected when she is lied to, promises are broken, or 
she is defrauded.180  The third level of well-being Gewirth calls “additive.”181  In 
this level, the abilities and conditions required to increase one’s level of purpose 
fulfillment are provided.182  Additive well-being is denied when one is not 
provided decent health care, education, or a reasonable opportunity to improve 
his economic wherewithal to advance from his current level of purpose 
fulfillment.183  Thus, implied by the well-being component, are important 
elements in service to guaranteeing equality beyond the existence of an “equal 
right,” insofar as everyone needs to have these elements as they seek to manifest 
their basic freedoms toward purpose-fulfillment. 
Gewirth also points out how differences between freedom and well-being 
might work to resolve conflicts of rights issues where liberty and equality might 
appear to be in conflict.184  For example, in the case where a person would use 
his freedom to attack the basic well-being of another, he necessarily creates a 
transactional inconsistency by illogically implying his rights override those of 
the other, even though, as an agent, his rights are no different from those of 
another.185  Under such circumstances, the recipient is certainly justified in using 
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all reasonable self-defense measures to protect his own well-being, provided his 
actions are proportionate to the threat he seeks to overcome.186  But what about 
conflicts of rights involving different levels of well-being, such as lying to 
protect the basic rights of innocent people?187  In that case, because basic well-
being is more important to being an agent than non-subtractive well-being, lying 
to protect an innocent person is justified where there is no other way to guarantee 
the person’s protection, such as by way of an impartial trial with Due Process 
guarantees.188  A historical example of such a situation would be lying to the 
Gestapo as to where a Jewish family might be hiding.  Gewirth sees these two 
resolutions of conflict of rights as where the PGC applies directly on individuals 
to guide actions.189  For purposes of this Article, however, it is important to focus 
on Gewirth’s third relevant area of conflict resolution, where he promotes the 
construction and engagement of impartial governmental institutions, as defined 
by the rule of law, to assist in the resolution of conflicts of rights more 
generally.190 
Because human agents are often biased by their own perspective, the creation 
and use of impartial institutions, like courts and various forms of arbitration, the 
PGC acknowledges, provided due process concerns are met, are better suited to 
resolving conflicts that arise from personal self-interest.191  Here the freedom 
component operates to provide protections for consent, privacy, and personal 
autonomy.  For example, this is done by protecting against forced membership 
in voluntary organizations and by requiring existing governments, if they are to 
be morally justified, to provide a means for consent to their decision procedures 
by those subject to their law.192  On the well-being side, the PGC requires 
governments and international organizations to work together to protect against 
violations of basic rights wherever they might occur.193  It also requires that 
governments do as much as possible to increase the well-being of their own 
people to the maximum degree possible within their own means, as well as for 
wealthier governments to aid poorer governments in developing the well-being 
of their subjects, since all agents are morally the same in that they are voluntary 
purposive human agents.194  Thus, one finds by way of the indirect applications 
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of the PGC moral grounds to support the original aspirations of the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of  Human Rights,195 but also for the subsequent 
adoptions of the legally obligatory covenants to protect civil, political,196 
economic, social, and cultural rights,197 as well as those involving the 
elimination of discrimination based on race198or gender.199  Here, international 
law provides, by way of formal treaty,200custom, and practice201 (that is, state 
practice and opinio juris202), the ground for universalization between individual 
and collective notions of the person at the international level.  This latter 
recognition is embodied in explicit and implied roles of equality as a separate 
comparative means that international courts, like the International Court of 
Justice, can use for evaluating liberty across cultures, at least where specific 
treaty reservations, which themselves may sometimes be morally suspect, have 
not been invoked.203 
The liberty interests found under the PGC are interests presumably any agent 
could advance because, facially, they do not interfere with the equal liberty of 
other agents’ same basic rights or other highly valuable interests.204  Such basic 
liberty interests, especially if they involve important roles that human beings are 
inclined to identify with as a basis of their self-fulfillment, should be deemed 
fundamental; particularly is this the case when these interests could not 
otherwise be accommodated or could only be accommodated by alternative 
means and only at great effort and expense.205  This is especially true on the 
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liberty side, where a particular liberty, like the right to marry, might be described 
so as to deny access to the same right, or to deny what fundamentally makes it 
of value to others.  Consequently, as Hart has noted, imbedded in the idea of a 
right, especially a liberty right, is the idea that it cannot be generally denied.206  
But again, one has to be cautious, for the liberty right might be so described that 
on the surface, it might appear to be generally accessible based on what the right 
is, but in reality it limits those who would seek to make use of its essential 
qualities because of how it is being defined.  For example, if the right to marry 
is defined to only include same-race or opposite-sex couples, then access by 
interracial and same-sex couples to fundamental aspects of marriage—that 
normally attach to couples with rights and duties to one another—will be denied 
where a less restrictive definition would otherwise make these same aspects 
available.207  In this instance, essential ingredients that make the marriage right 
desirable, and not just attractive, are what is being denied, even though access 
to the right is seemingly open to all.208 
The other place in Gewirth’s system where equality takes root is where he 
describes resolving conflict of rights involving different levels of well-being.209  
Prevention or removal of transactional inconsistency when one person or group 
attempts to use its rights to deny those same rights to another person or group is 
an obvious case.  Another place is where a tradeoff is offered between denying 
a lesser good of well-being (such as, in the moral area, not lying) to offset a 
greater good (such as life).210  Obviously, in the case of basic well-being, these 
goods always trump non-subtractive or additive well-being; similarly, non-
subtractive well-being will usually trump additive well-being, although there 
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might be occasions where small amounts of non-subtractive well-being are 
overcome by great improvements in additive well-being, such as by taxing all 
citizens, regardless of whether they have children, to support public education 
and thus enhance purpose fulfillment.211  Here the point is Kantian, not 
utilitarian, in ensuring what is needed for basic autonomy and self-fulfillment is 
not denied to the least advantaged.212 
At the societal, legislative level, differences of degree must account for the 
possibility that the degree of sacrifice of a seemingly greater degree of well-
being may be comparatively small, if it applies to fewer persons on less than 
fundamental issues and when juxtaposed against a far greater increase of 
additive well-being involving many people on very important issues directly 
affecting agency.  Here, one might set the choice from behind a Rawlsian veil 
of personal ignorance and ask whether, as rational beings, not knowing how it 
will affect them personally, one would consent to the adjustment assuming a 
statistical average amount of risk aversion as is appropriate to people living in a 
given society?213  All of this suggests that a correct understanding of rights to 
freedom and well-being, in the sense of adding to individual self-fulfillment 
collectively, should help in the development of a framework where Due Process 
and Equal Protection concerns can reasonably be reconciled.  The two 
considerations need not be posited as operating against one another, but instead 
can be seen to operate together through a collective recognition in which 
individual persons acknowledge the equal standing of one another in order to 
achieve maximum self-fulfillment for all.214  This is the collective sense of 
personhood that was sought after earlier, as necessary to resolve conflicts of 
rights.215 
VI. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Given the forgoing, how might this philosophical background understand the 
relationship of Due Process and Equal Protection?  Recall that traditionally it 
was thought that Due Process is backward looking toward discovering “an 
existing or time-honored convention, described at the appropriate level of 
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generality.”216  By contrast, Equal Protection is forward looking “to invalidate 
practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were 
expected to endure.”217  In light of the discussion regarding liberty and equality, 
both of these views should now be seen as somewhat misleading.  What makes 
the Due Process analysis work is not that the right described has a longstanding 
history.  Slavery had a longstanding tradition; that does not mean Due Process 
should recognize a right to own slaves even absent the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
adoption.  While a longstanding history might aid the right’s recognition, a 
failure to have a longstanding history should not mean the right does not exist.  
If that were the case, both the Court’s decision in Loving, insofar as it was a Due 
Process case, and Obergefell, would have been wrongly decided, for the issues 
in those cases were not whether marriage was a fundamental right (though there 
is case evidence to suggest that had long been believed),218 but whether state 
marriage laws could limit the interpretation of marriage for whites to only marry 
whites or for everyone (white or nonwhite) to only marry people of the opposite-
sex.219  Nor is this conclusion altered by saying that the Court’s determination 
of the constitutionally appropriate level of generality for the right to marry 
disallowed states from imposing these limitations.  For the Court offered no 
definite criteria for deciding what the appropriate level of generality is, at least 
not before considering Equal Protection.220  And indeed, the level of generality 
the Court was willing to consider may have changed over time.221 
What makes the decision in these cases correct is that the fundamental right 
involved, namely marriage, is unfettered from certain previous conventions that 
had defined the institution of marriage.  As such, the fundamental right described 
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here is derived from the basic interest in freedom as autonomy combined with 
the existing institution of marriage.222  Moreover, what makes the right to marry 
or any right fundamental is its impact on basic well-being compared to its 
nonexistence or circumscribed application where the reasons are not in service 
to maximize overall well-being.  Although the right to marry is fundamental, it 
is not basic in the sense of being a basic freedom because it is not independent 
of institutional facts or social conventions.223  Consequently, when it becomes 
apparent over time that some of the conventions that may have previously gone 
unnoticed when describing the institution may now be regarded as 
discriminatory, equality becomes important to rid the institution of its 
discriminatory elements.  This is where Equal Protection instructs the meaning 
and reach of the liberty.  Not allowing access by various groups to the essential 
ingredients that make the institution self-fulfilling, such as the ability to make 
more efficient health care and property decisions among spouses, or the self-
fulfillment from public identification as a fully committed unit, are reasons to 
alter the institution’s description, absent a compelling reason for maintaining the 
existing description.224  For it is these essential elements that describe the basic 
liberty interest behind the institution and shows what makes the institution 
attractive. 
Foremost among the self-fulfilling interests that explain why marriage is 
fundamental is the role it plays for the couple and society at large by publicly 
affirming the couple’s decision to be seen and treated both legally and socially 
as a unit.225  That factor should be seen as central to the Due Process liberty 
aspect that gives rise to the fundamental right once it is recognized that other 
factors, such as the ability to naturally procreate, are not necessary to the 
determination of this fundamental right.226  History and tradition may play a role 
here, but only in serving to bring into the foreground this important self-fulfilling 
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factor once other considerations are no longer found to be material.  Since other 
considerations may have at one time been thought to be material, this also means 
that history and tradition are only guides to discovering why the institution might 
have originally been thought to be fundamental, not the basis for its 
fundamentalism.  History and tradition do not provide normative grounds even 
if they do provide a factual background for racial or sex-based discrimination, 
let alone establish such discrimination as fundamental.  What makes the right to 
marry fundamental, then, is its special connection to the basic, natural 
background liberty interest in freedom that most people identify as important to 
their own self-fulfillment, and without which would otherwise be very difficult 
to fully obtain. 
A separate question concerns biases that might limit whose basic liberties the 
law will protect in any given situation.  Here, Equal Protection as a form of 
comparative equality analysis, can be seen to borrow from a kind of Gewirthian 
analysis to protect against classifications that are deemed invidious.227  Gewirth 
noted that “the PGC requires a general respect for all other prospective purposive 
agents with regard not only to the external effects of their agency but also, and 
primarily, to the factors of rational personhood and aspiration that support and 
generate these effects.”228  He points out that “[i]n consequence of such respect, 
each person must refrain from feelings or exhibiting contempt toward others; 
persons must not be insulted, belittled, or patronized, nor must they be 
discriminated against on grounds of race, religion, or nationality.”229  Obviously, 
“the factors of rational personhood and aspiration” are closely linked to the 
basic, non-subtractive, and additive goods of well-being, all of which are 
important to human self-fulfillment.230  As such, it is fair to say that a similar 
link should exist between these goods and the safeguards of equality that Equal 
Protection affords.  Such safeguards include, beyond affording some rational 
basis protection for additive goods, an application of strict scrutiny for any 
denial of fundamental rights likely to impact basic liberties.  These safeguards 
should also apply when the government classifies a group based on race or 
ethnicity, as such classifications are highly likely (given past history and 
experience) to be discriminatory and thus denying of the full range of human 
agency.231  And even in those cases where a short-term racial bias might be 
justified to offset presently existing effects of past racial discrimination—
because the nature of the de facto discrimination is so endemic to existing social 
structures as to provide no other alternative for resolution—Equal Protection, as 
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an operant of fair equality, requires that the ability to discriminate be narrowly 
tailored so as not to sweep too broadly into what otherwise would be a protected 
area of background liberty rights.232 
Additionally, governmental classifications that are likely to be pursued simply 
because of some underlying stereotype involving gender or illegitimacy should 
be subject to heightened scrutiny to ensure they are indeed supported by “an 
important governmental interest,” and only attained by “means that are 
substantially related to that interest.”233  This set of categories should also 
include forms of invidious discrimination based on sexual orientation, as these 
too would be just as likely to be irrelevant as classifications involving race, 
religion, nationality, or sex (including trans-sex).  Here, one sees that such 
classifications only appear to pit one’s ability to be an agent against another’s, 
whose apparent purpose-fulfillment may be masking a hidden claim to 
superiority. 
For most other classifications, however, it is usually enough that the 
government show a rational connection “to a legitimate governmental interest,” 
regardless of how well the connection actually serves that interest.234  This latter 
can be seen as a way well-being might also be advanced by recourse to the 
freedoms associated with the normal democratic processes, provided they are 
available and operative.  However, as mentioned earlier, some classifications 
brought under rational basis, involving mental health235 or denial of a legislative 
remedy to prevent sexual orientation discrimination without first obtaining a 
state constitutional amendment,236 were properly afforded a heightened form of 
rational basis review because it appeared that the government action may have 
been the result of prejudice or antipathy against a politically powerless group.237  
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In these instances, the government had to show more than just a rational 
connection to a legitimate governmental interest, something more substantial to 
acknowledge the likely potential for harm that might affect these individuals’ 
basic well-being.238  Exactly how much more the government has to show has 
not yet been made clear by the Court, although under one test, it must be strong 
enough to offset a per se violation of Equal Protection.239  Certainly, this is an 
area where further work needs to be done to ensure the basic liberties of affected 
groups are protected. 
On its face, the current classification scheme makes sense, but only as a 
starting point, given how biases that may have gone previously unrecognized 
become discovered through increased social awareness, as indicated by the 
aforesaid cases.  As such, there necessarily needs to be greater fluidity in the 
determination of levels of scrutiny that courts will consider, as aspects of social 
life not previously thought to be biased are now brought into public perception.  
Here, it is important to take such perceptions into account, while at the same 
time critically evaluating them, to ensure that courts do not mistake what might 
be simply the result of a political choice by a legislature (such as creating a 
graduated income tax) as giving rise to a new discriminated class or to a change 
in the level of scrutiny, unless the legislation represents an obviously irrational 
or unjustified bias, that is systemic in society, and degrading of human 
dignity.240  This latter limitation is necessary to prevent new forms of 
discrimination from taking hold that are likely to undermine the above 
framework of liberties and equality that need to be protected if human autonomy 
and overall purpose-fulfillment is to advance. 
At the strict scrutiny level, this concern is accounted for when the class is 
identified as a “suspect class” because it has suffered historical discrimination 
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for reasons irrelevant to its ability to perform and contrary to the ideals of Equal 
Protection, and the class is generally thought to be politically powerless to 
correct the discrimination by access to the political branches.241  Under such 
circumstances, Equal Protection should operate to protect against unwarranted 
bias against any group, since the nature of the bias itself will affect basic well-
being of how people are viewed, as it will likely prevent opportunity for 
correction by the normal political process.  By and large, the concerns least 
needed for such strict or even heightened scrutiny involve distributions of 
benefits or detriments thought to impact only comparatively minor liberty 
interests or interests that are likely to be handled by the normal political process, 
and certainly only ones that have never been thought to be fundamental.242 
What should be the criteria for determining whether the interest is 
fundamental?  In Plyler, the Court held that “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ 
granted to individuals by the Constitution.”243  Perhaps this should now be 
reconsidered, given how important access to educational opportunities are for 
advancing individual well-being and full participation in a free society, as the 
Court in Plyler itself admitted.244  Indeed, education itself, even aside from its 
obvious usefulness in obtaining a job and living a full life, will provide the tools 
for discovering forms of discrimination not traditionally recognized but, when 
recognized, serve the overall good of society by protecting the basic well-being 
of all society’s members.245  So, even when not considered a fundamental right, 
access to education is certainly a liberty interest of upmost importance both to 
the individual and society.246  Indeed, one could speculate, though probably 
mistakenly, that the only reason for education not being a fundamental right is 
because its importance to society is well recognized, although not necessarily in 
the same way or for the same purposes that one would expect the political 
branches to take it adequately into account.247  Of course, how little this is true 
is easily seen if one examines the different views political parties have about 
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education and how few political contests are actually determined on the basis of 
educational issues.248 
However, the importance of education to the individual should also be 
considered when particular groups are denied access to education because they 
are politically powerless.  This was the issue in Plyler.249  There, the concern 
that undocumented Mexican children might be systematically denied an 
education stood out as an equality-based reason for the Court to hold that such 
denial placed the state in the position of likely creating a “subclass of 
[unemployable] illiterates[,]” among persons who, because of their young age, 
had done no wrong by being in the country.250  Nevertheless, these children 
would suffer throughout their life by being denied access to the same public 
education documented children would automatically be entitled to.251  Since 
undocumented children had not been identified by the Court as a suspect class 
directly warranting heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection, the Court, 
nevertheless, could see the unfairness and effect on basic well-being that would 
result when innocent children brought into the  country are denied an education 
necessary to become productive members of society wherever they might live.252  
But if this is not just a policy choice, as courts are not supposed to make policy, 
the principle behind it must be made clear. 
It is true that policies, like those involving public school funding, insofar as 
they concern the economic, social, and political goals of the society, have 
generally been left to be decided by the political branches of the states and not 
to be resolved by the federal courts.253  Indeed, this is seen to be consonant with 
a person’s ability to express her autonomy through the democratic process.  
However, these policies must be subject to judicial review, usually by state 
courts under state constitutional restrictions in order to protect against policy 
choices that might be fundamentally unfair.254  This is not an invasion of a 
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legislative prerogative by the judicial branch.  If anything, it is quite the opposite.  
It is protection of the fairness rights of individuals against legislative inattention.  
The legislature, to secure some economic or political benefit of its own, ignores 
principles of justice and fairness essential to basic well-being just because it can 
do so with little or no consequence to itself. 
What the Court did in Plyer was the opposite of what it did in Obergefell and 
Loving, where it extracted from the definition of marriage limitations that made 
it less than generally accessible as a desirable institution.255  In Plyer, the Court 
imputed into education, which it said was not a fundamental right, a degree of 
importance as a matter of basic liberty because it was that importance that was 
being systematically denied to a whole group of people who had no real say in 
their being present in the United States.256  The Court was affirming the value of 
education as a basic liberty interest because of its likely effect on a future class 
of persons whose voice to the political branches would likely go unheard. 
Where the liberty interest is fundamental, Equal Protection should operate to 
ensure that any state interference is justified by a compelling interest that is 
narrowly tailored, but that would include that the liberty interest not undermine 
other equally fundamental rights.  Such a compelling interest may sometimes 
come about in the form of protecting another fundamental right that might 
otherwise be seriously curtailed if the original fundamental interest in question 
is treated as absolute.  Since the two interests would both be deemed 
fundamental, the question has to be asked which interest provides the greater 
respect, or least harm, to overall purpose-fulfillment as an essential ingredient to 
human well-being.257  For example, allowing a baker of wedding cakes to refuse 
to make a cake for a same-sex wedding—because it would violate the baker’s 
sincerely held religious convictions—is an example of where choosing to enter 
the wedding cake business (itself a less than fundamental liberty interest)258 must 
be accompanied by a commitment to serve the public as a whole.  If not so 
viewed, the denial could negatively implicate the fundamental right to marry as 
a socially established institution that has a wide-ranging effect on human self-
fulfillment, and for which the government (if it allowed businesses to 
discriminate) would be complicit in disavowing.  Here is where the liberty 
interest to become a wedding cake-maker, florist, or operator of a reception hall, 
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must not be allowed to limit the freedom of others to exercise their fundamental 
rights in a society, especially when such exercise is protected by a public 
accommodations laws.259  This is made especially poignant (but only in fact, not 
in principle) if the couple resides in an area where only a single cake maker, 
florist, or operator of a reception hall exists.  So, the point is general. 
The collective well-being that same-sex couples experience when they make 
use of the cultural symbols that express their marriage is likely to be a part of 
the essential self-fulfillment that accompanies the marriage, and without which 
they might feel that their marriage is not as good as others.  Thus, when 
businesses that are supposed to be serving the public without discrimination are 
allowed to deny access to these important symbols of marriage because of 
personal religious beliefs, the result is likely to have a greater negative impact 
on the self-fulfillment of the discriminated group because it bears societal 
approval.260  The same degree of lack of self-fulfillment does not need to be 
experienced in the reverse.  The individual baker in satisfying his or her own 
religious tenets could still be consonant with his sincerely held religious beliefs 
either by not being in the wedding cake business at all, or by pursuing other 
avenues (such as the presentation of his own values in appropriate public 
forums) that do not deny a particular culturally relevant good or service to a 
specific class of persons.  Indeed, the situation of the baker who refuses to 
provide a cake for a same-sex wedding is no different from that of another baker 
who, on religious grounds, might refuse to make a wedding cake for an 
interracial couple whose interracial marriage his religion did not recognize.261 
The same would not be true, however, if a clergyperson chose not to marry a 
same-sex couple and was told by the government that she must do so.  In that 
case, the fundamental right of free exercise of religion overrides any claim of 
access because the government is not complicit in the religious operation and in 
fact, under the First Amendment, is barred from being so involved, and also 
because choice of religion is generally regarded as a personal right that 
traditionally has been thought to not affect others.262  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s 
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
can be seen to reflect this private view of religion insofar as his criticism was 
directed at the Civil Rights Commissioners who made disparaging remarks 
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about the cakemaker’s religious beliefs.263  And insofar as anyone’s beliefs are 
private, those beliefs do not, on their own, invite intrusion by the state because 
they are truly a self-regarding mental act in which no one else’s interest is 
involved, regardless of whether others would agree or disagree with them.264 
That said, focusing on the baker’s sincerely held religious beliefs as the reason 
for him not making a wedding cake and not his lack of action, as was arguably 
done by the Commission, confuses the issue because it invites the question 
whether a cakemaker may be required to compromise his beliefs in order to 
conform to laws that require public accommodations not to discriminate against 
same-sex couples.265  Moreover, it opens the door to a different question: 
whether, under the First Amendment, the state can legitimately criticize the 
baker’s religious belief which, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, it clearly cannot.  
Even if there exists a causal connection between the belief and the inaction, the 
two issues are not necessarily connected.  Presumably, the belief could have still 
been held by the cakemaker, even expressed in other forums without failing to 
provide the business accommodation.  Were, however, the cakemaker asked to 
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write a statement (such as one regarding the kind of marriages Christianity 
supports), portray a symbol (such as swastika), or depict an action (such as 
fellatio), that he would not write or portray on any customer’s cake, the situation 
would be quite different because it asks him to go beyond what he would do for 
any customer in the same situation, thus bringing the action outside Equal 
Protection guarantees and indeed implicating what beliefs he feels comfortable 
expressing in violation of First Amendment speech and free exercise 
protections.266 
The belief itself is private insofar as it is the mental acceptance of an idea as 
true, and thus its protection is a basic liberty interest.  It is the failure to provide 
the accommodation to all on the same basis that is not private and thus also 
undermines a basic well-being interest in the equal right of others to access the 
institution of marriage in all its cultural aspects.  In Masterpiece Cakeshop, had 
the Commission focused on the failure to provide the accommodation and not 
the cause of the failure (the private belief), its decision would and should have 
been upheld.267  Then, the question would properly be whether the failure to 
provide the accommodation was truly an other-regarding act that society’s 
fundamental concern to preserve equality provides a justification to prevent.  
The failure of the Commission to focus its criticism on the baker’s unwillingness 
to provide its business service to the general public, instead of focusing on the 
Commissions members’ disagreement with the religious belief of the individual 
cake maker, grounded Justice Kennedy’s narrow opinion in favor of the 
Cakeshop. 
This analysis also provides support for where to draw the line on appeals to 
religious beliefs when individuals and organizations enter into the provision of 
public services in the 20th/21st centuries—such as hospitals, adoption agencies, 
social service agencies, employers, insurance payors, and more.268  Operators of 
these institutions are not similarly situated with clergy, because while religion is 
highly personal in its self-fulfillment, control over commerce, including public 
accommodations and health provisioning, is normally an area of government 
responsibility.269  The government might allow some religious-based limitations 
                                               
 266. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1735–36.   Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
describes approvingly “at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the 
refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, 
along with religious text.”  Id. at 1730. 
 267. Id. at 1734.  At the end of his opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy writes: 
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in 
the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with 
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting 
gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market. 
Id. at 1732. 
 268. Andrew Copson, Services Must Stay Secular, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/dec/05/guardiansocietysupplement.comment. 
 269. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
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in these areas for delivery of goods and services by not-for-profit organizations, 
insofar as these may have little impact on the public, since they are thought to 
be more closely associated with particular groups who already share the 
provider’s beliefs.270  However, especially in the for-profit commercial area, the 
issue becomes more problematic if the religious organization operates a business 
that serves the public; for then, in respect to that operation, the business should 
not be immune from charges of discrimination in employment, housing, or 
public accommodations.271 
This suggests that persons or organizations who would find themselves at 
odds with their own sincerely held beliefs by complying with public 
accommodations laws when providing a good or service, generally should not 
be operating as a for-profit business, and instead limit those products or services 
to which they associate special symbolism to private or not-for-profit activities 
that the law does not in the same respect restrict.  The baker in the wedding cake 
example, where a public accommodation law prohibited discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, could by operating as a non-profit, limit his making of 
wedding cakes only for opposite-sex couples because now he would no longer 
be operating as a business serving the public as a whole.  Of those products, he 
might wish to not make available to the public as a whole, he could continue to 
provide as a non-profit operation connected to a particular religious view, so 
long as he did not, at the same time, hold himself out to the public as a business 
proving wedding cakes unavailable to everyone.  Equality in service to 
supporting collective self-fulfillment must therefore be part of any decision 
regarding such a conflict of rights.  It may not just be set aside whenever an 
individual’s liberty interest might give rise to a conflict, or the equality concern 
will be lost in its entirety and the natural right to equal liberty itself will be 
endangered of evisceration. 
If the right to enter a business is a protected liberty interest, it certainly should 
not be construed to undermine fundamental liberty rights of anybody, for that 
would undercut the overarching protection of the person, understood 
collectively, on which this analysis has been based.272  Indeed, if the ultimate 
goal is to protect basic liberty in its fullest sense, as the cases mentioned suggest, 
                                               
 270. In On Liberty, Mill also noted “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, 
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not 
involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced 
or deceived.”  MILL, supra note 264; see generally Susannah Camic Tahk, Tax-Exempt Hospitals 
and Their Communities, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 33, 35–37 (2014) (discussing the need for lawmakers 
to grapple with how these hospitals define their communities). 
 271. See generally Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 192 (2012) (holding unanimously that a “teacher” was a minister and, as such, was not entitled 
to file an Americans with Disabilities lawsuit against the school where she was employed). 
 272. In West Coast Hotel Co, the Court, while not explicitly overruling Lochner, upheld the 
State of Washington’s minimum wage law, in effect signaling an end of the Lochner era in which 
the Supreme Court invalidated laws designed to regulate business.  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). 
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then instances where a rights conflict initiated by a lesser protected liberty 
interest might interfere with a basic liberty or fundamental right, strict scrutiny 
must be applied to ensure that the interference is truly in service to securing 
maximal liberty for all.  This should be the goal regardless of whether the 
business owner(s) also can claim a protected classification based on religion, for 
that claim can be alternatively handled without violating a fundamental right.  
Personhood, in this collective sense, requires no less of the Court nor of 
democracy. Indeed, when personhood is understood in the way just described, it 
can serve as the ground for how the democracy is to operate in regard to 
protecting fundamental rights. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests that at the intersection of Due Process and Equal 
Protection, a place Justice Kennedy identifies in Obergefell, there is need for 
further clarification if lower courts are to be provided direction in deciding future 
cases involving either doctrine, and especially in cases where the two doctrines 
intersect.  As it stands right now, exactly how such cases will be decided is 
unclear, although the language in Obergefell and Plyler (the latter because of the 
Court’s willingness to raise the level of scrutiny), when read together, suggest a 
direction of where the law might be going.  That direction is consistent with 
subsuming fundamental rights doctrine and Equal Protection analysis under a 
broader ethical theory of the person, understood collectively, that utilizes 
personhood’s centrality of freedom and well-being to further clarify how the two 
doctrines might operate together.  Within that frame of reference, the 
relationship between the two areas becomes clear as criteria begin to emerge for 
deciding future cases where the doctrines intersect.  Indeed, if this Article is 
successful, it will be because it takes the reader to the next higher level of ethical 
consideration, beyond mere legal doctrine, to finding a framework for providing 












                                               
 273. See generally VINCENT J. SAMAR, JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACTICING LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 31–35, 76–78 (1998) (discussing the need for a philosophical foundation for law). 
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